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Rapporteur's Preface
In preparation for this report, the Rapporteur met or received evidence from the following:
SHAPE, Mons 
- 
18th March 1991
General John R. Galvin. US A, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;
Lieutenant General Antonio Milani, IT A, Deputy Chief of Staff, SACEUR's WEU Liaison
Officer:
Brigadier General Dieter Schott, GE A, Deputy Chief. Arms Control Branch;
Minister Kent Brown, US, Political Adviser;
Mr. Harry Brown, UK, Special Assistant for Strategic and Global Events;
Colonel Jacques Fontaine. BE A, Belgian National Military Representative;
Colonel Kleffner, GE A, Operations Division;
Colonel Graham Messervy-Whiting, UK A, SHAPE Special Briefer.
Brussels 
- 
18th March l99l
General Joseph Charlier, Chief of the Belgian Defence Staff.
NATO Headquarters, Evire 
- 
19th March l99l
General Antoon Everaert, BE AR, Belgian Military Representative;
Mr. Marcel Leroy, Head. NATO/Multilateral Affairs and Policy Planning Section, Political
Affairs Division;
Mr. M. Jochems, Head of Defence Policy Section, Defence Planning and Policy Division;
Mr. W. Kischlat, Head of Disarmament and Arms Control Section, Political Affairs Division.
and Mr. P. K. Augustine:
Mr. H. Pfeiffer. Director of Force Planning, Defence Planning and Policy Division;
Colonel M. Bracher, GE AF, Strategic and Planning Branch, Plans and Policy Division.
Belgian/Netherlands Joint Mine-Warfare School (EGUERMIN), Ostend 
- 
19th March l99l
Captain J. Timmerman, BE NA, Commandant.
The committee asa whole visited the Headquarters of the Franco- Gennan Brigade in Boblingen
on 8th l,{oyember 1990 and was briefed by:
General Jean-Pierre Sengeisen, Commandant, and his staff.
The committee and the Rapportear extend their thanks to those ministers, officials and senior
officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions.
The opinions expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the com-
mittee.
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Draft Recommendation
on arms control: force reductions and the rdle of multinational units
The Assembly,
(i) Conscious that Soviet redeployment undermines the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional
Armaments in Europe signed in Paris in November 1990, but insisting on full respect for both the
letter and the spirit of this international agreement;
(ii) Looking forward to a convention on a global ban on the manufacture, possession and use of
chemical weapons, together with appropriate verification methods;
(iii) Insisting that discussions should now begin on considerably reducing numbers of short-range
nuclear weapons;
(iv) Determined that general agreement should be reached on the regulation of arms sales, preferably
within a United Nations context;
(r) Noting that unco-ordinated defence budget cuts in the majority of member countries are pro-
ceeding apace;
(vi) Reiterating the need to maintain transatlantic solidarity through NATOI
(fii) Emphasising the development within the Atlantic Alliance of a European pillar, which should be
comprised of all European NATO members who wish to be associated;
(viii) In the knowledge that the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee has already discussed the
creation of a European multinational rapid action force and that NATO's Military Committee has
endorsed the idea of a NATO multinational rapid reaction force;
(ix) Respecting the sovereignty of each member nation,
RrconnarNos rHAT rue CouNcu-
l. Encourage member nations to begin the ratification process of the Treaty of Paris while
remaining firm with the Soviet Union on respect for both the letter and the spirit of the CFE
Agreement;
2. Encourage member nations to give a common impetus to the United Nations Conference on
Disarmament with a view to obtaining a convention on a global ban on the manufacture, possession
and use of chemical weapons, together with an appropriate verification rdgime;
3. Make the services of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments available to the United
Nations for advice on verification of the chemical arms ban on Iraq;
4. Urge the United States and the Soviet Union to begin the promised discussions on considerably
reduced numbers of short-range nuclear weapons;
5. Institute a register of arms sales by member countries, support European initiatives to ensure
transparency in this domain and urge the United Nations Security Council to begin the process of
seeking a general agreement on the regulation of arms sales;
6. Initiate discussion within WEU on the co-ordination necessary to ensure that a sufficient level of
security is maintained in Europe despite cuts in national defence budgets;
7 . Express its wholehearted support for the need to maintain transatlantic solidarity through
NATO and emphasise that the European pillar within the alliance should be composed of all European
members of NATO who wish to be so associated;
8. Instruct its chiefs of defence staff to begin work on the creation of a permanent multinational
command structure capable of planning, co-ordinating and exercising WEU actions in the context of
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.
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Draft Recommendation
replying to the annual repon of the Council
The Assembly,
Considering the security and defence aspects of the annual report of the Council,
RgcoruprrNns rHAT rnr CouNcl-
l. Instruct its Defence Representatives Group to make a study of the suggestions in the present
report concerning multinational units and report;
2. Provide the Assembly with fuller accounts of the discussions held by its various bodies and give
the Assembly priority of information concerning its decisions;
3. Instruct the WEU lnstitute for Security Studies to prepare unclassified versions of its reports and
discussron papers and forward them to the Assembly;
4. Continue to provide the Assembly with information regarding inspections carried out by the
WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Uyttendaele, Yice-Chairman and Rapporleur)
I. Introduction
l. This subject cannot be approached
without considering as a background the situ-
ation in greater Europe lying between the
Atlantic Ocean and the Urals a short time after
the calming effect of East-West d6tente.
2. The former Eastern Europe is in fact
divided into Central Europe (a former, now
updated notion) and the Soviet Union. The two
parts of Germany have been reunited and this
situation is causing many difficulties. Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania
are liable to be engulfed in a political and eco-
nomic vacuum. Internal political tension is
shaking the Soviet Union which is having
enormous difficulty in transforming its eco-
nomic system into a freer one. Separatist move-
ments are active in various neighbouring
republics. Albania and Yugoslavia give an old-
style picture of the Balkans where a mosaic of
nationalities and ethnic minorities is creating
unrest, spreading uncertainty and causing
tension.
3. The vacuum in Central Europe must be
filled. The whole of Western Europe should
endeavour to do this jointly, thus preserving the
best chances of peace. The danger inherent in
any action taken to this end by a single western
country or by a newly-balanced Soviet Union
seems quite evident. Former East-West oppo-
sition might be resuscitated should a dominating
state in Central Europe demonstrate its strength
by mastering the idea of a peaceful Europe. ln
any event, the Soviet Union will remain a power
to be feared which will permanently represent an
imminent threat, whatever its future evo-
lution.
4. Many Western European countries are
almost feverishly seeking greater European
unity. However, numerous reasons indicate that
progress will have to be gradual. If a true, well-
balanced European security and defence policy
is to be achieved in the framework of the
alliance, a European foreign policy must first be
defined. This policy will first serve to avert con-
flicts and if, notwithstanding preventive mea-
sures, a conflict should become imminent,
political, diplomatic and non-armed means
should be mobilised to find a peaceful solution
without European defence proper, in the
strictest meaning of the word, having to be used.
To be able to introduce such a policy and
concept, which seem quite natural, all the
partners 
- 
starting with the larger states - will
have to accept a European imprint on their
countries and abandon the idea of imposing
their own views of Europe; in other words, the
Europe of tomorrow, even unified, will in this
area, for a very long and even unforeseeable
time, remain a compromise Europe determined
by the wisdom or lack of wisdom of partici-
pants.
5. The so-called neutral states such as
Austria, Sweden and Switzerland realise that the
reason for their neutrality is becoming less
logical, economically at least, and they are doing
their utmost to draw closer to Europe, which is
becoming increasingly unified at economic
level.
6. The states of Eastern Europe (Central
Europe by any other name) are insisting on
being allowed to accede to Western Europe's
economic unity and to this end are also invoking
reasons of security and independence. They are
being encouraged in this by certain members of
the European Community which is already seen
by some as possibly the Twenty-four, rather than
the Twelve.
7. The approaches referred to in paragraphs
5 and 6 in no way simplify the definition of a
European foreign, security and defence policy.
To involve in this process too many countries
which have not yet attained the required stage of
maturity from a European standpoint could but
lead to extreme confusion and risk total failure
in these areas.
8. In order to have an idea of the arms
control, force reductions and European defence
that would result from a strengthening of the
European pillar in NATO, there must be
agreement from the outset on what Europe we
are talking about. It is clear that a report ema-
nating from WEU considers its own
organisation to be the most appropriate for
developing these ideas. Even a superficial com-
parison between the possibilities and difficulties
suggests that, in spite of the magnitude of the
difficulties and obstacles that WEU must
overcome, the latter are in any event far less
than those of other bodies in terms of choosing
the framework for European defence. It must
never be forgotten that it is possible to hold talks
and conclude agreements with absolutely
anyone on arms control and force reductions,
but it must be realised that one's own defence
can be worked out on a joint basis only by
turning to friends, persons of like mind and
allies.
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II. Arms control
9. In Paris on l9th November 1990.
twenty-two countries, including the nine WEU
member states, signed the treaty on conven-
tional forces in Europe. A protocol dated the
same day made applicable for twelve months a
number of provisions in this treaty even before
ratification.
10. The signatory states have not yet ratified
this treaty. The Soviet Union has withdrawn
some of its troops (or is planning to do so) to the
other side of the Urals, i.e. outside the area
covered by the treaty. This is in conformity with
the letter of the treaty but in no way respects its
spirit. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had
forecast sending a number of armed forces,
about three divisions, elsewhere; they have been
assigned to naval forces. This measure infringes
both the letter and the spirit of the treaty. The
United States claims that this is one of the
reasons which encourage it not to ratify the
treaty.
11. However this may be, ratification is
preferable, since it will then be possible to
apply all the verification measures, so that if a
signatory makes a wrong move it may. without
prejudice to other steps, be the subject of legal
action. It may also be considered that ratifi-
cation in these circumstances would be proof
of a positive attitude inspiring confidence. It is
also true that various signatories, including
some members of WEU, are already taking
steps to reduce their arsenals of weapons even
below the levels of authorised ceilings laid
down in the treaty. To hesitate about ratifying
would create an incomprehensible and uncom-
fortable situation.
12. This treaty is clearly not an end in itself.
For instance, the Geneva negotiations should
lead in the future to a worldwide ban on all
chemical weapons. Furthermore, it must be
ensured that all short-range nuclear weapons are
banned as soon as possible. (United States-
Soviet talks on the subject are supposed to begin
soon after the implementation of the CFE
Treaty.)
13. The r6le of the arms trade is worthy of
close attention. Since Western Europe is one of
the world's leading arms producers, there will
have to be regulations banning supplies of arms
at European level. These must be as wide-
ranging as possible, possibly starting with the
WEU partners. In this connection, national leg-
islation is not enough as long as it can be over-
ridden by other national legislations 
- 
even by
friendly nations. The recent past brought out
sufficiently well and on several occasions that it
is these very uncontrolled or furtive supplies of
arms which can jeopardise the containment of
conflicts.
III. Force reductions
14. The logical effect of East-West d6tente,
further accentuated by the abovementioned
treaty of 19th November, is a reduction of forces
in Europe. Cuts in the defence budgets of the
WEU member states certainly prove that we are
on the right road but that WEU or NATO allies
seldom consult each other, in spite of the
Assembly's strong recommendation emanating
from the session last Decemberr.
15. This reduction will not necessarily lead to
security being endangered as long as " national "
reductions are applied everywhere in a con-
certed manner and by common agreement with
the other members of the alliances.
16. In view of the disappearance of the
former threat but taking account of its different
nature and the existence of new hotbeds of
unrest in regions along Europe's frontiers, it may
be necessary to offset the smaller number of
troops and armaments by increased mobility
and flexibility.
17. A very clear distinction must be drawn
between security and defence. Defence may
prove necessary to ensure security. As said
above, it is not always necessary to have the
same partners in talks on security and/or
defence.
18. Easy though it may be to speak or write
about mobility and flexibility, it is difficult to
put them into practice. Efforts, mainly financial,
are required. Quite astronomical sums have to
be invested if the goal we have set ourselves in
this connection is to be attained in practice.
Hence the need to share the costs.
19. Subject to the consideration in paragraph
4, it is perhaps now time to establish full
European defence which would be a major,
essential and even vital instrument of European
foreign policy and diplomacy. To this end. the
following principles should be borne in mind:
(a) maintenance of national sovereignty;
(b) building within existing structures and
maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance;
(c/ readiness to extend the number of
members actively concerned.
20. Better than any other existing European
organisation, WEU is the body par excellence
for achieving this European defence. By means
of treaties, on the one hand, the WEU member
states have confirmed their intention to move
l. Recommendation 493, paragraph l0:
" Noting that defence budget cuts rn the majorrty of member
countries are forcrng an unco-ordrnated reappraisal of
delence priorrtres. the Assembly RECOMMENDS that the
Councrl rnstrtute consultatlon wrthrn WEU on the optimum
future structure ofEuropean forces, prelerabty before further
cuts rn natlonal defence budgets are made. "
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steadily towards the achievement of European
union while, on the other hand, the modified
Brussels Treaty admits that the WEU countries
organise their defence through the collective
structures of NATO. Furthermore, WEU is still
a useful forum in which France (which left the
NATO integrated military structure in 1966) has
an opportunity to discuss defence matters
openly and unrestrictedly with its European
partners. This in no way means that the course
to be followed to give tangible shape to WEU as
a European pillar vis-d-vis NATO and WEU vis-
a-vis the Economic Community will not be long
and diflicult. In any event, it will have to be
ensured that the flow of information is harmo-
nious and that ef{icient co-ordination of security
and defence policy can be achieved.
21. The organisation ofEuropean defence has
the advantage of allowing Europe to become, in
part, more independent of the United States.
This in no way means that the United States
presence in Europe in the framework of NATO
is useless or no longer of importance. Quite the
reverse. The reasons underlying the existence of
NATO and the presence of - certainly fewer -
United States troops are still valid. It must also
be realised that the very presence of United
States armed forces protects Europe against
itself since their physical presence prevents one
or more European states 
- 
in a period of virulent
nationalism 
- 
being a danger for other member
states.
22. The United States, on the other hand, is
afraid the development of European defence
may become a centrifugal force in NATO, thus
weakening and not strengthening it. However,
there seem no grounds for this fear since it is
evident that it is not intended to build European
defence entirely outside NATO structures.
Nevertheless, the United States should under-
stand that situations may arise in Europe that in
no way require its presence which indeed might
even be undesirable il for instance, there was a
risk of automatically making the Soviet Union
react in such a manner as to make a given situ-
ation immediately seem far more serious.
European defence in the framework of WEU
also means that WEU might act outside the
NATO area as an entity provided national sov-
ereignty is respected (as has been the case during
the Gulf crisis where WEU has directly sup-
ported the United Nations embargo).
IV. Multinational units
23. Paragraph 14 of the London Declaration
provides that NATO will have multinational
corps made up of national units.
24. It would be better to describe these units
as " European units " in the context of the
European pillar of NATO. This description by
definition covers the notion of multinationality
but also suggests that these formations contain
no non-European units. Europe will indeed
always be a body composed of various national-
ities. It is enough to think of WEU where there
are nine members and seven different lan-
guages.
25. The formation of multinational units
raises a series of problems, including:
- 
differences in the status of personnel:
regulars, volunteers, militia. Differ-
ences in financial and social status. Dif-
ferent disciplinary systems;
- 
different weapons and equipmentl
- 
different training:
- 
different language, customs and men-
talities.
26. Insofar as possible, these differences must
be eliminated in the long term, inter alia
through:
- 
standardisation of armamentsl
- 
uniformisation of training;
- 
organisation of joint manoeuvres;
- 
joint management and use of
manoeuvre areas which should be suffi-
ciently large and numerous:
- 
jointly-organised recycling and spe-
cialisation of officers (cf. the anti-mine
operations already organised by the
mine warfare school at Ostend)l
- 
improved knowledge of languages
among officers.
27. It is usually considered that multinational
units should have two sections: rapid (imme-
diate) forces and main defence forces.
28. Generally speaking, it is agreed that each
partner, even the smallest, would provide units
for the rapid reaction forces and would be
responsible for equipment, armaments,
transport and supplies. Although for each spe-
cific intervention national sovereignty might
continue to operate, there should nevertheless
be provision for certain procedures and sce-
narios to ensure that the significance of this
force is not a dead letter.
29. Both for the rapid reaction forces and the
main defence forces, a European command
structure would be set up and would be the only
visible and permanently present organisation of
European defence. The size of the armed force
to be engaged would be determined on a case-
by-case basis in the light of the nature of the
conflict and the desired degree of inter-
vention.
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30. The troops should therefore remain
national and, in practice, have a threefold task
to carry out, i.e. at national level, in the NATO
framework and in the European context.
31. In some circles it is considered that multi-
national corps should be formed with a par-
ticular " leading nation ". But it does not take a
great deal of imagination to foresee that, on the
day of the race, that particular nation may have
some very good reason, politically perhaps, not
to participate in a given action. What price then
the " leading nation "?
32. Much more preferable, in your
Rapporteur's opinion, to form a multinational
headquarters unit, with a measure of interna-
tional duplication and even redundancy, for
action only in the light of a particular situation
requiring European intervention.
33. It is obviously essential to retain the
major NATO multinational command struc-
tures that exist because at that high and very
important level all the member states repre-
sented have a say.
34. In view of the composition of the various
national armies and the trend of organisation in
certain countries, a brigade or brigade equiv-
alent should be the smallest national contri-
bution to the multinational main defence
forces.
35. It is obvious that there would be consid-
erable cost incurred in creating these multina-
tional units as your Rapporteur has already
emphasised. Hence the need to use the same
units for national, NATO and WEU purposes.
depending on the prevailing priority. This idea
is of course merely an extension of present
arrangements whereby forces " earmarked " for
NATO may be withdrawn in case of national
need (cf. British units for operations in Northern
Ireland or in the Falklands in 1982; British and
American units for the Gulf crisis).
36. As well as the idea advanced by the Secre-
tary-General of dual-hatting certain NATO
commanders with a WEU hat as well, the idea of
dual or even triple-hatting certain units must be
examined. These units would also have to be
reasonably versatile and adaptable for different
geographical (and hence climatological) areas.
37. Your Rapporteur was somewhat sur-
prised to meet some opposition to such ideas,
especially from certain United States com-
manders who have themselves used this system
of dual-hatting ever since NATO was invented!
In passing it is worth mentioning that if dual-
hatting of certain NATO European com-
manders comes to pass, one at least will have
come full circle: Commander-in-chief Channel,
based at Northwood, was originally a WEU cre-
ation...
(a) Specific units and proposals
38. In his report for the Assembly in 1989
(State ofEuropean security 
- 
intervention forces
and reinforcement for the Centre and the North,
Document ll83), Mr. Speed, Rapporteur, drew
the attention of members to a number of specific
forces:
- 
24th Airmobile Brigade (United
Kingdom);
- 
the Force d'Action Rapide (France);
- 
the United Kingdom/Netherlands
Landing Force;
- 
the Franco-German Brigade;
- 
the NATO Airborne Early Warning
Force.
The conclusions and recommendations of that
far-seeing report bear rereading and re-exami-
nation now.
39. In their various ways these specific forces
and others such as the NATO Standing Naval
Forces Atlantic and Channel and the Mediter-
ranean On-call Force have made important con-
tributions to the cause of multinationality and
may well serve as examples for further multina-
tional co-operation.
40. The British 24th Airmobile Brigade is
likely to form part of the new multinational
European Corps discussed by the NATO Mil-
itary Committee at its meeting in April 1990(the day after the nine member countries of
WEU, also at the level of chiefs of defence staff,
had included the same item on their agenda. We
wait with interesr to see which of the NATO
countries will be participatine!). It is obvious
that elements of the NATO rapid reaction force
will have also to be earmarked for WEU for
so-called out-of-area operations.
41. The French Force d'Action Rapitle, or at
least part of it, participated with 61an in the
coalition's re-taking of Kuwait. In many ways
this force, created in 1985, has pioneered the art
(and science) of rapid action. What better recog-
nition of the fact (and also of France's initiatives
during its presidency of WEU) than to position
the future headquarters of a WEU force d'action
rapide at Maisons-Laffitte (headquarters of the
French FAR), to plan and execute the exercises
such a force would need to practise its r6le? It is
worthy of note in passing that various other
members of WEU are in the process of following
the French example in creating national rapid
action forces (e.g. Belgium. Italy, the Nether-
lands, Spain) and that this should lead logically
to further multinational co-operation.
42. The United Kingdom/Itletherlands
Landing Force colld well be viewed as the
nucleus of a WEU amphibious unit, such as
envisaged by the Defence Committee when
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adopting Document ll39 in May 1988 (Naval
aviation; Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson). Due to
celebrate its 20th anniversary in 1992 this unit
has epitomised multinational co-operation (as
has the Belgian-Dutch minewarfare school at
Ostend in its special domain) and has developed
amphibiosity to a fine art. The ideal fire brigade
unit in an amphibious context, the United
Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force could
easily have an out-of-area rdle as a prime
example of two member countries' staunch com-
mitment to WEU. Even as this is written, 400
Dutch marines are leaving, together with 600
other Dutch soldiers, to help establish and
protect the enclaves set up for Kurdish refugees
in northern Iraq. Britrsh marines and French
troops are also involved in these operations with
WEU helping to organise the logistic support.
(b) The Franco-German Brigade
43. When the Defence Committee visited the
Franco-German Brigade in Btiblingen last
November, it was impressed with the military
sense which had been given to what was origi-
nally essentially a political gesture. As an experi-
mental formation, the brigade has spent the past
two years studying and testing options for tac-
tical, operational and logistic co-operation and
interoperability. The headquarters element has
had to wrestle with such thorny problems as dis-
cipline, working routines, pay and allowances,
uniform, legal questions, etc.. etc., as well of
course as with equipment compatibility. In
essence it is the headquarters unit and the com-
munications and logistic parts of the brigade
which are integrated the other elements
remain either purely French or German.
44. It is however obvious that the brigade
could have an enhanced rdle: as the embryo of a
European airmobile brigade, perhaps, if
reformed? (The present r6le is limited either to
territorial defence or in support of NATO's
Central Army Group.) For operations outside
the NATO area the hitherto unsurmountable
problem of German participation would require
the sort of solution proposed by Chancellor
Kohl.
(c) The NATO Airborne Early ll/arning Force et al
45. Both at sea with the Standing Naval Force
Atlantic and in the air with the AWACS force,
NATO has been very successful already in cre-
ating multinationality and interoperability.
What is needed now is flexibility of employment
and diversification into other realms.
46. The AWACS aircraft are registered in
Luxembourg, a founder member both of WEU
and NATO. During the Gulf crisis, various air-
craft were deployed on the southern flank to
keep an eye open for any airborne threat to
Turkey. But because of the NATO insignia on
their tailplane it was not possible to deploy them
further afield... It would now be worthwhile
investigating the possibility of assigning at least
some to a WEU operational organisation (the
new verification agency soon to be decided on,
we trust, by WEU ministers?), so that future
WEU operations might gain some very effective
eyes and ears. Both British and French AWACS
aircraft are not at present part of the NATO
arrangement...
4'1. Similar principles might have applica-
tions in other air force realms as well: maritime
patrol, tankers for air-to-air refuelling, transport
aircraft 
- 
all come to mind. All are expensive to
acquire by an individual nation, all were
essential during the Gulf crisis. These ideas are
further developed by the Defence Committee in
a parallel report on the lessons learned from the
Gulf (The Gulf crisis - lessons for Western
European Union, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop
Scheffer).
V. Conclusions
48. As a result of reduced East-West confron-
tation, diminishing levels of armed forces,
shrinking defence budgets, increasing costs of
technology, etc., etc., our nations are having to
co-operate more and more, both where pro-
curement and where operations are concerned.
No state wants to rely totally on others for its
own defence and rdle-specialisation is too
restricting an avenue to follow. The answer is
therefore multinationality, which is why the
topic is so high on current agendas. But that
same multinationality in defence is subject
essentially to the political will of the partners
concerned to co-operate and take a similar line
in foreign affairs and security.
49. Events since the WEU nations reaffirmed
their commitments to each other by subscribing
to The Hague platform in October 1987 have
proved that the Nine are able to make progress
in defence matters. They will continue to make
progress on the subject of multinationality.
YI. Reply to the annual report of the Council
(a) The commitlee's remit
50. As previously, the Presidential Com-
mittee has referred to the Defence Committee
the sections of the Council's annual report con-
cerning:
- 
the Council's activities relating to
security in the framework of the
Atlantic Alliance, the control of arma-
ments and disarmament;
- 
the application of Protocol No. II on
WEU forces;
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- 
the activities of the Agency for the
Control of Armaments.
(b) Information received
51. The second part of the thirty-fifth annual
report of the Council (Document 12l9) and the
first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the
Council (Document 1247), plus the information
letters of the Secretary-General, have continued
to provide more of the sort of information the
Assembly has been requesting over past years
and are indicative of the evolving nature of the
Council's work and consultations. At the time of
writing, the second half of the thirty-sixth
annual report of the Council had just been
received, so comment has been brought up to
date where possible.
(c) The work of the Council
52. At its different levels and in its various
bodies, the Council is to be congratulated on the
breadth of the discussions which have taken
place over the past year and which are now
starting to bear fruit. The major activity of note
has of course concerned the Gulf crisis and
comment on this will be found in a parallel
report of the Defence Committee (The Gulf
crisis 
- 
lessons for Western European Union,
Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer).
(i) Actitities of the Special Working Group
53. The Special Working Group (SWG) has
continued to provide the forum for study of
the major politico-military issues affecting
European security. The main focus of the
group's work during the period has been firstly
the impact of the changes in Central and Eastern
Europe and the CFE negotiations in Vienna
and secondly the future shape of European
security.
54. In accordance with the mandate from the
November 1989 ministerial meeting, the SWG
and Defence Representatives Group (DRG)
carried out a study evaluating Europe's likely
security environment during the period l99l-
1995. The joint conclusions of the group's work
were presented to the Council of Ministers in
Brussels on 23rd April 1990 along with a series
of questions for ministers to discuss:
- 
the prospects for arms control with a
view to the holding of a CSCE summit
during 1990;
- 
how to maintain credible deterrence at
reduced levels of forces;
- 
how to make appropriate changes in
strategic doctrines, operational con-
cepts and force structures;
- 
the general implications for European
defence and security co-operation.
55. Ministers took note of the work done by
the SWG and the DRG on the European
security environment l99l-1995 and their dis-
cussions on this subject contributed to the for-
mulation of the communiqu6 published at the
end of the meeting.
56. The SWG has since discussed how to fulfil
the task given to WEU by ministers at their
April meeting (paragraph 9 of the Brussels
communiqu6), namely, to elaborate a common
approach with regard to the 1990 summit
meetings of the Atlantic Alliance and the CSCE.
In this context the group addressed a number of
themes:
- 
future security architecture for
Europe;
- 
the r61e of Europe in a changing
Atlantic Alliance;
- 
post-CFE arms control objectives.
57. In the second half of the year, the Special
Working Group and the Defence Representa-
tives Group held five joint meetings.
58. " In dealing with topical questions, dele-
gates have exchanged information and comment
on developments in the Gulf crisis, the
co-ordination measures adopted by WEU coun-
tries and the diplomatic initiatives designed to
strengthen the application of the embargo. The
Special Working Group has decided to retain on
its agenda the problem created by the existence
of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle
East, which may well represent an even greater
threat in the region by the end of the
century. "
59. " On the basis of an informal document
submitted by the WEU Institute and a Secre-
tariat working document, the delegations to
these meetings considered the problems that
would have to be solved before the conclusion of
the CFE agreement negotiations: air forces and
ground-based aeronaval forces; circumvention
and verification at a time when the withdrawal
of modern Soviet equipment to the east of the
Urals is accelerating; the question of parity,
taking into account the decisions as to sub-
regional apportionment; personnel strength; and
the definition of sufficiency, whose implications
are as much political as they are military. The
Special Working Group prepared for the NATO
High-Level Task Force seminar held in Rome
on I lth September, devoted to the steps to be
taken between the Paris CSCE summit and the
Helsinki review conference scheduled for 1992.
In the declaration adopted at the London
summit, WEU states undertook, together with
their allies, " to work for fresh negotiations with
the same mandate, the aim being to limit the
r0
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strength of armed forces in Europe. Since the
bloc-to-bloc criterion no longer applies, in the
situation that has existed in Europe since 3rd
October and with the German Government's
declared intentions as to the organisation of the
defence of the unified Germany, the western
approach must be adapted to changing circum-
stances. Steps should be taken here and now to
define a European position on the global
political concept and on general objectives for
the continuance of the conventional arms
control negotiations that will follow the Helsinki
review conference in 1992. The stress should
also be on the gradual development of
confidence-building measures which should,
despite Soviet hesitancy, be promoted in a prag-
matic spirit. "
60. As part of the preparations for the Paris
summit, delegations discussed the security
institutions to be established under CSCE.
" The plan to set up a conflict prevention
centre, based on the principles set out in para-
graph 22 of the London declaration, was the
subject of broad-ranging discussion. If a centre
of this kind is to be genuinely capable of
reducing the risk of confrontation, it must have
the benefit of direct means of communication
among states to increase the flow of available
information and thus prevent misunder-
standing and miscalculation. The centre's
essential function, then, should be to clarify
unusual military activity and implement
confidence-building measures. Thereafter,
political conciliation at the time when conflict
is imminent can be envisaged only if the centre
has proved its worth in the priority field of
achieving transparency. "
61. " The problems of European security
co-operation will continue to be debated in the
light of developments in the Atlantic Alliance,
with due regard for NATO's current strategic
review. " 
- 
how right they were...
(ii) Actitities of the DeJbnce Representatives
Group
62. The DRG held five meetings in its own
right during the first half of 1990, as well as onejoint meeting with the SWG. The majority of its
activities focused on two broad areas of work in
preparation for the Ministerial Council in
April.
63. The first of these involved a study, with
the SWG, of the European security envi-
ronment in the period l99l-1995. As a contri-
bution to this study, the DRG produced its own
assessment of the need to maintain an undi-
minished level of security pending full imple-
mentation of a CFE agreement, and of the
factors affecting the military balance post-
CFE.
64. The second area ofwork concerned verifi-
cation where the DRG proposed to ministers
that member countries should co-operate in:
- 
preparing a programme of trial bilateral
inspections (to commence in autumn
1990) whereby the nations participating
could gain experience gLLh. active and
passive aspects of a CFE verification
r6gime;
- 
opening a number of their national
inspection teams to participation by
inspectors from other member coun-
tries, thereby making best use of
available resources and assisting
member countries in participating fully
in the verification processl
- 
opening their inspector training courses
to nationals of other member countries,
thereby ensuring a certain commonality
of standards;
- 
indicating, if appropriate, any geo-
graphical areas on which they were
interested in focusing their verification
activities, while retaining the right to
inspect wherever they wished, thus ena-
bling them to target their training and
to identify an informal division of
labour.
65. In their communiqu6, ministers welcomed
these proposals, as well as the fact that a group of
DRG experts had prepared a report on shared
data-processing for verification which had subse-
quently been submitted to the NATO High Level
Task Force (HLTF) by WEU countries.
66. After the April Ministerial Council, the
DRG concentrated on the remit in the
communiqu6 to prepare for the Atlantic and
CSCE summits by discussing the evolution of
alliance strategies, the military aspects of multi-
national forces and the military implications of
the institutionalisation of the CSCE.
67. A regular item on the DRG agenda has
been the issue of military contacts with the
Soviet Union and, in addition to a report on the
CSCE seminar on military doctrine, the group
has been briefed on visits to the Soviet Union by
Belgian, French, Netherlands and United
Kingdom Delegations.
68. The Defence Representatives Group met
on 9th October 1990 to continue its discussion
on the problems of verification of the future
CFE agreement and to review experience with
bilateral trial inspections conducted by member
states. A report on co-operation on verification
was submitted to the Enlarged Council meeting
on 29th November. The group embarked on
preparations for the meeting of chiefs-of-staff
(held on 1Oth April l99l), the agenda for which
focused on the lessons to be learned from devel-
ll
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opments in the Gulf crisis, but also covered the
evaluation of out-of-Europe risks and the advis-
ability of having joint intervention facilities, a
review of NATO strategy, and Soviet military
capabilities by the year 1995.
69. On 27th September a meeting of verifi-
cation experts was held in London to compare
national experiences with setting up bodies
responsible for the implementation of verifi-
cation missions, training and inspectors'
equipment and training.
70. The Defence Committee is particularly
pleased that the Defence Representatives Group
has come into its own over the past year or so
and is making a positive contribution to many
aspects of European security which our reports
have themselves emphasised.
(iii) Activities o.f the Mediterranean Sub-Group
7 l. During 1990, the Mediterranean Sub-
Group concentrated its attention on three sets of
problems affecting European security.
72. Firstly, developments in the Maghreb and
the conflict in the Western Sahara. Members of
the group considered that it was vital to
encourage the development of the political dia-
logue and that Europe should step up initiatives
to promote regional co-operation aimed at
enhancing stability in the Western Mediter-
ranean. The present moves towards establishing
CSCM as a forum for discussion are directly rel-
evant to these concerns.
'73. Secondly, political consultation within the
group focused on events in Eastern Europe and
their implications for the Balkans. The collapse
of hitherto dominant political r6gimes, the
re-awakening of nationalism and the resurgence
of ethnic problems make any prediction about
future developments in the region both difficult
and uncertain. " Analysis of the repercussions
of the current developments will remain
uppermost among the group's concerns. " Again
these reflections should be of immense use in
understanding present developments.
14. Lastly, the group embarked upon a study
of the potential threat represented by the prolife-
ration of ballistic missiles. The group has
analysed the consequences of this proliferation
in the Mediterranean basin and in the Middle
East and expressed the hope that many more
countries will join the MTCR (Missile Tech-
nology Control R6gime). This work was accom-
plished before the implications became evident
in the current Gulf problems, but once again
demonstrated the good work being done in
WEU.
7 5. The group also finished its report on naval
deployments in the Mediterranean, the conclu-
sions of which were submitted to ministers.
76. The Chairman of the Mediterranean Sub-
group was to have briefed the Defence Com-
mittee on the sub-group's conclusions. but with
the intervention of the Gulf crisis, the discussion
has had to be postponed until the autumn. when
the Defence Committee will be preparing its
report on Mediterranean security (Rapporteur:
Mr. Kittelmann).
(irl) Activities of the ad hoc Sub-Group otl
Space
77. During this period the ad hoc Sub-Group
on Space held eight plenary meetings, as well as
other meetings at expert level.
78. The sub-group has continued its work to
outline a detailed study on the development of a
European satellite observation system with three
objectives: verification of arms control agree-
ments, crisis monitoring and the monitoring of
environmental hazards.
79. In April I 990, ministers noted the
progress which had been made, and called for
concrete proposals to be submitted with a view
to examining the possibility of establishing a sat-
ellite observation agency. The sub-group is cur-
rently working to this remit.
80. The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space met on
24th and 28th September and 7th November to
finalise the report requested by ministers at their
April meeting and to draft a ministerial decision
to be referred to the Enlarged Council. Several
meetings of experts were also held on technical
aspects of the planned space co-operation
projects.
81. As a result WEU ministers:
" ...underlined the need for a step-by-step
approach to the phased establishment of a
space-based observation system in which,
as a first stage of co-operation. a centre
could be an important and concrete
element around which co-operation on
space observation would be developed.
They decided to mandate the ad hoc Sub-Group
on Space:
(a) to study further the practical arrange-
ments for setting up such a centre with
a view to taking a decision at the min-
isterial meeting in spring 1991. Such a
centre:
- 
should be a WEU subsidiary organ,in accordance with Article VIII,
paragraph 2, of the modified
Brussels Treaty;
- 
should have the immediate task of
training European experts in the
photo-interpretation of satellite-
derived data and the gathering, pro-
cessing, analysis and interpretation
of accessible data, should make data
t2
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available to member states and
should report the results to WEU
and its member states;
- 
should receive, in order to carry out
its tasks, assistance from member
states and might also have some of
its own resources to enable it to
begin work autonomously;
- 
should have its activities reviewed
no later than three years after it has
entered into operation.
(b) to deftne. in time for the next minis-
terial meeting, the requirements for
studies on medium- and long-term
space co-operation with a view to
establishing a European space-based
observation system. "
82. The Defence Committee at its March
meeting in Palermo was fully briefed on progress
to date. The Chairman of the committee has
written to all members of the Assembly to
encourage them to urge national governments to
make a positive decision in favour of the WEU
verification agency at the next ministerial
meeting (scheduled now for June l99l).
(v) WEU Institute 
.for Securitt, Studies
83. The Paris ministerial organs were wound
up at the end of June 1990 and the WEU
Institute for Security Studies took up its duties
officially on lst July 1990. The Institute, estab-
lished under the aegis of the Council, has been
given two, inter-related missions:
- 
study and research for the governments
of the member states of WEU repre-
sented by the Council and in consul-
tation with the Secretariat-General of
the organisation. The independent and
objective nature of this work is laid
down in a number of the main clauses
of the ministerial decision of l3th
November 1989;
- 
stimulating the wider debate on
European security issues: the Institute
will develop links with the other rel-
evant institutes and centres of researchl
develop new structures for meetings
and dialogue with individuals from
non-WEU countries, in particular with
the countries of Eastern and Central
Europe; establish a data-bank on the
range of research undertaken in Europe
on security issues.
84. In addition the Institute is charged with:
" creating networks for exchanges between
those concerned in the media, parlia-
ments (in particular the parliamentary
Assembly of WEU), national administra-
tions, universities and industry. "
85. The initial work programme is concen-
trated around four broad areas:
- 
the European security identity;
- 
the development of European security
structures;
- 
Western European defence issues;
- 
economic and North-South dimensions
of European security.
86. It has been much appreciated that on
occasion Rapporteurs from the Assembly's com-
mittees have been invited to attend the relevant
seminar. Your Rapporteur hopes that such con-
tacts may be increased in the future and that
studies carried out by the Institute may be made
available to members of the Assembly, as
promised by the Secretary-General. (Sadly, not
yet the case, given the " highly-classified "
nature of such studies...)
(w) Agenc'y 
.lbr the Control o.f'Annarnents
87. In addition to its residual tasks in respect of
atomic, biological and chemical weapons control,
the Agency for the Control of Armaments fol-
lowed the work of the Conference on Disarm-
ament in Geneva in these areas. particularly the
negotiations to bring about a convention on the
prohibition of chemical weapons and those aimed
at strengthening the 1972 convention on the pro-
hibition of biological weapons.
88. As for the programme of inspections
carried out by the ACA, the area examined has
increased considerably with the unification of
Germany. The whole of Germany is now in
theory subject to the application of the accords
on chemical weapons and WEU inspectors
should be able to examine the incidence of
activity concerning chemical or inter-related
materials wherever they may be located.
89. As the only agency which has specialised in
chemical arms control for the last 35 years, the
WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments
should surely have a starring rOle to play in veri-
fying Iraq's compliance with the latest United
Nations directives concerning chemical weapons.
Has the Council remembered that it possesses
such an agency and offered its services to the
United Nations?
90. In Document 1204, Force comparisons(NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) -
reply to the annual report of the Council(Rapporteur: Mr. Steiner), the committee
expressed its disappointment that information
on inspections carried out by the ACA was
missing from the Council's 1989 reports. The
Council in 1990 has given a little more detail,
but nothing like the sort of information which
used to be furnished:
" l. Atomic weapons
The ACA does not exercise any control
over these weapons.
l3
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2. Biological weapons
All member states agreed to carry forward
to 1990 the 1989 list of biological
weapons subject to control. The Council
took note.
As in previous years, however, the ACA
exercised no control over these weapons.
3. Chemical weapons
All member states notified the agency that
they agreed to carry forward, during 1990.
the list of chemical equipment and
products (chemical weapons) subject to
control applicable in 1989. The Council
took note.
Following the usual procedure, the agency
asked member states whether there had
been any actual production of chemical
weapons on their mainland territory. All
member states replied in the negative.
No country reported holding chemical
weapons on the mainland of Europe.
Also following the usual procedure, four
' agreed non-production measures' were
carried out at the chemical production
plants. In exercising these controls, the
ACA observed nothing contrary to
the undertakings not to manufacture
chemical weapons. "
VII. The implementation of Protocol No. II
on WEU forces
91. The committee is grateful to the Council
for responding to its last critique concerning
information on the implementation of Protocol
No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty on
Western European Union forces and supplying
the following detail in the thirty-sixth annual
report:
" l. Forces of WEU member states under
NATO command: implementation of
Article IV of Protocol No. II
(i) ln accordance with Article IV of Pro-
tocol No. Il, and in order that it may
establish that the limits specified in
Articles I and II of that protocol are being
observed. the Council received infor-
mation acquired as a result of inspections
carried out by the Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Europe. The information, which
was forwarded by the SACEUR represent-
ative, reviewed the situation regarding
forces assigned to NATO by WEU
member states as of 3 I st December
I 990.
(ii) The presentation by the SACEUR
representative, who was accompanied by
other SHAPE representatives, gave rise to
a discussion with members of the Council.
in particular on the structure offorces, the
current process of the NATO strategy
review and the concept of multinational
forces.
2. The average number of British land
forces stationed on the mainland of
Europe during the first nine months of
1990 in accordance with the commitmentin Article VI of Protocol No. II was
50 023. In addition there were on average
I 103 personnel, excluded from the above,
deployed on short tours of duty to
Northern Ireland to meet the continued
need for the presence of troops there. An
average of 460 personnel, excluded from
the above, were also deployed to meet
commitments in Cyprus. As previously
stated these units would have been
speedily returned to their duty station in
an emergency affecting NATO.
So far as the strength of the United
Kingdom's contribution to the second tac-
tical allied air force in 1990 is concerned,
there is no change to the 1989 figures. For
convenience these are shown below:
R6le .hrt'rali/
equtptnent Squadrons
Strike/attack
Offensive
support
Reconnais-
sance
Air defence
Air transport
Ground
defence
Tornado
Harrier
Tornado
Phantom
Rapier
surface-to-air
missiles
Puma
Chinook
RAF
regiment
7
2
I
2
4
1
I
I
In the last quarter of 1990 some 23 000
land forces, 27 Tornado GRI aircraft and
elements of the RAF regiment were
deployed to the Gulf from Germany as
part of the coalition forces. The bulk of
these have now returned. " (In itself this
was a remarkable logistic operation.)
92. The committee is pleased that the stat-
utory information for 1990 has been made
available. Although the European situation is
evolving laster than one may sometimes write.
the Council should continue to respect the pro-
visions of the modified Brussels Treaty unless
and until it is formally revised.
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YIII. Postscript
93. Throughout this reply to the annual
report of the Council it is obvious that the
Council and its organs are infinitely more
active than even only a few years ago. In this
sense, as well as in an operational context
where the Gulf crisis is concerned, WEU is well
and truly reactivated. The information-flow
from the Secretary-General to the Assembly is
vastly improved also. But while regular infor-
mation is now given on what is being done,
(" this meeting, that seminar ", etc., etc.) very
little substance of what is actually being dis-
cussed, the pros and cons of such and such a
course of action, details of deliberation in the
various instances (such as the SWG, DRG, etc.)
is in fact transmitted to parliamentarians, who
often come to hear of the Council's opinions
through third parties or the press. This is par-
ticularly important at present when the current
structure of European security is under review
and decisions of far-reaching consequence are
imminent.
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